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CASE NOTES
principal commendation of open balancing is that it "compels a judge
to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized,
rational account of how he arrives at them--more particularized and more
rational at least than the familar parade of hallowed abstractions, elastic
absolutes, and selective history. '26 Open balancing would ensure the pro-
tection to the press and at the same time provide a safeguard against
the danger of allowing the press an inordinate amount of freedom. Essen-
tial protection would thus be afforded all rights embodied in the Con-
stitution. Therefore, it is hoped, that in deciding future free speech cases,
the Court will return to the use of the balancing concept.
Shelmerdeane Miller
26 MENELrisoN, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CALIF. L. REv. 821, 828 (1962). Contra, FRANTZ, IS the First Amendment Law?-
A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-
WHEN DOES IT ACCRUE?
Danny Escobedo, a twenty-two-year-old resident of Chicago, was
arrested without a warrant about 8:00 Pv.M. on January 30, 1960, and
taken to a police station for interrogation about the murder of his brother-
in-law without formal charges being placed against him. The police told
him about an incriminating statement made by another suspect, and
urged him to admit the crime. Escobedo repeatedly requested to consult
with his attorney. The police answered that the lawyer did not want to
see him. About 11:00 P.M., Escobedo's lawyer, who had been trying to
meet with his client since 9:30 P.M., caught a glimpse of him, and they
exchanged waves before the lawyer was escorted away. Escobedo inter-
preted the wave as an instruction to keep quiet. Nevertheless, by midnight,
he made a statement incriminating himself in the crime.
At the trial, the state introduced the confession. A defense motion to
suppress it was overruled and Escobedo was convicted of murder. On
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the judgment was reversed on the
ground that certain evidence tended to show that the statement had been
the result of a promise of immunity from prosecution by the state.' On
rehearing, the judgment was affirmed. 2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in a 5 to 4 opinion h.ld that Escobedo's right to
' People v. Escobedo, No. 36707, I., Feb. 1,. 1963 (copy on file in the library of the
Chicago Bar Association).
2 People v. Escobedo, 28 M1. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
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counsel under the sixth amendment had been infringed and reversed the
judgment. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
The issue is, "whether, under the circumstances the refusal . . . to
honor petitioner's rights to consult with his lawyer during the course
of an interrogation constitutes a ... violation of the Sixth Amendment."'3
The Court reasons that the interrogation was at a crucial stage when
the accused could be made to give extremely damaging statements if
not protected by competent counsel. The presumption that the accused
knows the law is no longer to be indulged. Counsel could have warned
his client of the intricacies of Illinois law regarding complicity in murder.
It was the denial of the right to counsel which caused the client to be
deprived of this vital knowledge. The police failed to alert the accused
of his constitutional right not to make a statement. This failure, when
coupled with police refusal of the right to counsel, will void any con-
fession obtained.
The Court feels that we must maintain an adversary system of justice,
and not lapse into a system which depends on "confessions," with their
tendency to perpetuate coercive police methods. Fairness requires that
the accused be somewhat evenly matched against his accusers. The Court
concludes that once the inquiry has begun to focus on a suspect, the
right to counsel becomes absolute.
The real crux of the Escobedo case is its answer to the question:
When does the prosecution begin, since the sixth amendment gives the
right to counsel from the start of the "prosecution," not the "trial"?
The case of Po'well v. Alabama held that once the right to counsel is
conceded, the defendant must have counsel soon enough to prepare a
defense.4 A later case, held that four days was adequate time for counsel
to prepare for trial.5 Refusal to grant any time is clearly a violation of
due process.,
In the preceding cases, the denial of counsel occurred at the trial it-
self. In Massiah v. United States, the right was held to accrue before the
trial. 7 The Court held that in post-indictment and post-arraignment situa-
tions an accused is entitled to his lawyer's help and when admissions are
taken outside of counsel's presence, they will be inadmissible at the
3 378 U.S. at 479. The sixth amendment has been made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). Compare the non-capital case of Canizio
v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946).
6 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1947).
7377 U.S. 201 (1964). After being indicted and arraigned on a violation of a federal
narcotics law, a federal agent had Massiah's confederate elicit a set of admissions from
him which were relayed to the agent by secret radio and later introduced at the trial.
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trial. The Massiah case is actually the last link between those cases ex-
plaining the right to counsel at trial and those which deal with post-
indictment and pre-arraignment situations.
In Spano v. New York, the accused had been indicted for murder and,
after consulting with his attorney, surrendered to the police.8 Before his
arraignment, Spano was questioned for eight hours (in order for the
police to elicit a confession), while frequently requesting to speak with
his lawyer. The police refused to permit him to see his lawyer and, using
Spano's sympathy for an old buddy who had just become a rookie patrol-
man, got a confession out of him. The majority reversed the conviction
saying that (1) the police practiced an unfair deception on Spano by
refusing him access to counsel and by using his "old buddy" to obtain
the confession, and (2) the police were not trying to solve a crime since
Spano was already indicted. Justice Douglas, concurring, felt that the
accused's right to counsel should be absolute.
In Hamilton v. Alabama, the defendant, after indictment, appeared at
the arraignment without counsel and since "arraignment under Alabama
law is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding," a violation of due process
was found.9 A later case was remanded for further consideration in the
light of the Hamilton decision, where the petitioner, at his arraignment,
acknowledged the confession which was used to convict him. But he
did not have counsel, nor was he informed of this right to have counsel,
so that he might have intelligently waived it.1° In another case based on
the Hamilton holding, a plea of guilty was entered at a preliminary hear-
ing, before counsel was appointed for the indigent defendant. The plea
was later changed to "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity"
after appointed counsel conferred with the defendant. Because of the
admission of the first plea at the trial, the Court held that the hearing
where the plea was entered was equivalent: to Hamilton's arraignment
and the denial of counsel voided the convi.ction.ll
In Reece v. Georgia, the Court decided that the right to counsel existed
prior to indictment since state procedure requires that the composition of
the grand jury must be challenged before the indictment. 12 In the case of
Payne v. Arkansas, a mentally dull nineteen year old was, inter alia, de-
nied a hearing before a magistrate where lie would have been told of
his right to counsel and his right to silence.'8 He was held incommuni-
8 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 9 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
10 Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28 (1962) (per curiam).
11 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam). This seems too verrule
the case of Canizio v. New York, supra note 6.
12 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
13 356 U.S. 560 (1958). Accord, Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224 (1902).
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cado for three days without access to friend, counsel or family, and then
confessed. The Court held that "the totality of this course of conduct"
voided the confession. 14 The Court was later faced with a denial of
counsel to a college graduate with a year of law school. It decided, in the
case of Crooker v. California,'5 that mere custody and interrogation,
without bringing the accused before a magistrate, would not void a state
court determination as to a confession's validity.
In Cicenia v. Lagay,16 petitioner was an average person who reported
to the police at 9 A.M. at their request, after talking with his lawyer.
They immediately began to interrogate him about an unsolved murder of
which he had been accused. Cicenia's repeated requests to see his lawyer
were denied. At 2 P.M., the lawyer came to the station, asked to see his
client, and was refused. About 9:30 P.M., Cicenia broke, confessed, and
was then permitted to see his attorney. On these facts, and on the basis
of the Crooker case, it was held that it was not a violation of due process
to interrogate a suspect before permitting him to see counsel. The Crooker
decision announced a new rule, affirmed by the Cicenia decision, that
[S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process . . . if [the
accused] is deprived of counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, pro-
vided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with
an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of jus-
tice'. . . . The latter determination necessarily depends upon all the circum-
stances of the case.17
The Escobedo case seems to adopt this general rule while holding that
neither the Crooker case nor the Cicenia case are to be regarded as
controlling.' 8
Generally, as in the Escobedo case, a denial of the right to counsel is
coupled with a failure to advise the accused of his rights to counsel and to
silence. When the Court tries to interpret statutes from different juris-
dictions, conflicting decisions do result. One case upheld a statute which
said that before the state could grant counsel to a deserving man, he must
first state under oath that he is unable to employ counsel and that his case
entitled him to counsel. This same case held that the trial court had no duty
14 Id. at 567. (Emphasis in original).
15 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958). Justice Douglas' dissent noted that the pretrial period
is too dangerous, and the third degree too common, to even let anintelligent man
be without counsel. Accord, Powell v. Alabama, supra note 4.
16 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
17 Crooker v. California, supra note 15, at 439-40 (1958) (Emphasis added.).
18 378 U.S. at 492. This may not clarify how the Court feels about the Crooker case
(due to the high educational level of the defendant) but it does show a full reversal
of the Cicenia case as its facts so closely parallel the Escobedo case.
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to advise the accused of his rights to counsel. 19 Later, it was held that
failure to request counsel did not waive the right where the trial court
had not advised the defendant of it. The onus was placed on the trial
court to affirmatively protect the defendant's rights.2 0 However, if after
being advised of his rights, a defendant persists against his own interest,
he does so at his own risk.21
Much of the insistence, in due process cases, of warning a defendant of
his rights is used to overcome the failure of the local police to obey
statutes requiring the suspect to be brought before a magistrate within a
reasonable time after arrest.2 2 Federal cases deal head on with this require-
ment. In McNabb v. United States,23 the Court voided the conviction
obtained through the use of a confession which was the product of a
lengthy incommunicado detention, which contravened a requirement that
a suspect must first be brought before a magistrate and told of his rights.
This holding was widely attacked as hurting police efficiency but was
affirmed by the Court as good law in a case with similar facts. 2 4 Later, in
Mallory v. United States, where the facts were also similar to those in
the McNabb case, a confession was held to be inadmissible on the basis of
the McNabb decision and the sixth and fourteenth amendments.25
The now famous McNabb-Mallory Rule has its counterpart in a series
of due process decisions which deal with one of the crucial problems of
the Escobedo case: the incommunicado detention and secret interrogation.
If a person is logged into a police station for interrogation without being
formally booked or arraigned, this procedure, is known as the "small book
system." This is precisely what happened to Escobedo .2  The Court has
already established, in a famous series of cas -s, that confessions which are
the product of long incommunicado detention and interrogation are clear
violations of due process.2 7 This was not a serious problem in the Crooker
19 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). The dissent urged that the average man does
not know of his right to counsel and the help offered by the statute is ineffective when
the accused is not told of his rights. Id. at 679-81.
20 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
21 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952);
Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958).
22 Compare Payne v. Arkansas, supra note 13, with Crooker v. California, supra
note 15. See also White v. Maryland, supra note 11. For an example of statutory au-
thority see ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 108-1 (1963).
23 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
24 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
25 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
26 Record pp. 16, 20 and 29, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
27 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
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case, since the interrogation was not too lengthy. 28 Two later cases again
reviewed this topic and condemned the system. However, they were weak
precedents, since both defendants were mentally subnormal, while Esco-
bedo was about average.29 Finally, in Haynes v. Washington, the Court
ended the "small book system" in aw, but not in practice.8 0
While Escobedo's detention was not comparable to that of Haynes, the
Court refers to it by way of principle in its desire to avoid a system
which depends on "confessions" rather than justice. Where the voluntari-
ness of any confession is in doubt, it is the Court's duty to make its own
examination of the record.8 ' Thus the Court renders justice by remanding
the case and forcing the state to produce other sufficient evidence.8 2
Danny Escobedo was twenty-two years of age and of Mexican par-
entage. There was no showing that he was uneducated or otherwise de-
prived by virtue of his age or minority group or that he was of less than
average mentality. While many other confessions have been overturned
because of youth, minority group, low intelligence, mental illness, lack of
education or other coercion, these reasons do not apply here. 8 The con-
fession was virtually the only proof in the case and Danny Escobedo is
now a free man. Should he be free?
The Court seems to set up a tri-partite classification of persons who can
be subjects of police interrogation: witnesses, suspect persons and accused
persons. From witnesses, the police hope to secure either general back-
ground information or specific information as to the actual commission of
the crime. A witness who is closely linked to the crime may be elevated
to the level of suspect. When the "investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect"34 and the suspect is then arrested, he "had become the accused,
and the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get him' to confess his guilt
despite his constitutional right not to do so."35 At this level, the Escobedo
case decides that the right to counsel accrues.
28 Supra note 15.
29 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
30 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See note 42 infra.
81 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 479, n. 4. Accord, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944).
32 Cf. Payne v. Arkansas, supra note 13; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
33 Cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948);
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); McNeal
v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). In most of
these cases there was held to be, inter alia, a denial of the right to counsel which helped
to void the confession.
84 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). 85 Id. at 485.
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In Watts v. Indiana, Justice Jackson, concurring, noted one extreme in
police experience, and sought to protect society from it:
These murders were unwitnessed, and the only positive knowledge on which a
solution could be based was possessed by the killer. In each there was reason-
able ground to suspect an individual but not enough legal evidence to charge
him with guilt.... [T]he police attempted to meet the situation by taking the
suspect into custody and interrogating him... . The alternative was to close the
books on the crime and forget it.... This :is a grave choice for a society in
which two-thirds of the murders are already closed as insoluble8 6
Justice Goldberg, who wrote the opinion in the Escobedo case, held in
the Haynes case that not all "interrogation of witnesses and suspects is
impermissible. Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential tool in effec-
tive law enforcement. '37 If this still holds, then the Escobedo decision
shows how far Justice Goldberg will go to uphold the right to counsel
for accused persons.
Chief Justice Warren once warned that "the police must obey the law
while enforcing the law."38 8 He noted that, "as law enforcement officers
become more responsible, and the methods used to extract confessions
more sophisticated . . . our duty to enforce federal constitutional pro-
tection does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more
delicate judgments to be made."8 9 If the police are to become more re-
sponsible, new dangers must be controlled at the same time as the old
ones are abolished.
Among the worst of the old methods are the "small book system" and
incommunicado detention. It has been held that mere custody and exami-
nation is not dangerous and will not void a confession. 40 But the Watts
case held:
It would be naive to think that this protective custody was less than an inquisi-
tion. The man was held until he broke.... We should unequivocally condemn
the procedure and stand ready to outlaw any confession obtained during the
period of unlawful detention. The procedure breeds coerced confessions. It is
the root of the evil.41
Yet it continues and the police have learned no lesson from prior deci-
sions prohibiting this procedure. 42 Writer!; of texts for the police still
86 338 U.S. 49, 58 (1949). (Emphasis in original).
37373 U.S. at 514-15 (1963).
88Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959).
89 Id. at 322.
40 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
41 Watts v. Indiana, supra at 57.
42 This seems to be especially true of the Chicago Police Department. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
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advocate the use of the basics of the procedure along with "justifiable"
uses of deceit.43
Roscoe Pound, in recognizing the problem caused by incommunicado
grilling, arrived at the solution achieved in Escobedo.44 The Escobedo
decision mentions the English Judge's Rules which provide for a warning
of a set form to be administered to a suspect before questioning. They
further state that,
when after being cautioned a person is being questioned or elects to make a
statement, a record shall be kept... [and that] every person at any stage of the
interrogation should be able to communicate and consult privately with a so-
licitor. This was so even if he were in custody provided in such a case no un-
reasonable delay or hindrance was caused to the processes of investigation or
the administration of justice by his own doing so. 45
The Escobedo case requires that the attorney should be available; whereas
the English Judge's Rules might permit a delay of a few hours.
It may be that the decision in Escobedo v. Illinois is not as radical as
some would say. It is now only logical to extend this protection to sus-
pected persons as well as to accused persons. 46 A recent New York case,
cited with approval by the Court, held that the request for counsel cre-
ates a right to counsel at that moment and if the request is denied, any
subsequent confession is void.47 Although police work may be somewhat
limited by the decision, the Court feels that this area should be strongly
limited in order to protect individual rights.
Eliot Landau
43 See INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, 203-204 (1962). See
especially page 207 where the author states: "For related psychological considerations,
if an interrogation is to be had at all, it must be one based on an unhurried interview,
the necessary length of which will in many instances extend to several hours depending
upon various factors, such as the nature of the case situation and the personality of
the suspect." (Emphasis added).
44 24 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1014, 1017 (1934). He stated: "I submit that there should be
express provision for a legal examination of suspected or accused persons before a
magistrate; that those to be examined should be allowed to have counsel present to
safeguard their rights; that provision should be made for taking down the evidence
so as to guarantee accuracy."
45 Announcement of the New Judge's Rules, London Times, Jan. 25, 1964, quoted in
49 CORNELL L. Q. 418 (1964).
46 Note Justice White's prediction of the result in Escobedo and where else it will
apply. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 208-209 (1964) (dissent).
4 7 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628 (1963), cited in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964). There is a more extreme case where prosecution
was completely held precluded by a denial of counsel occurring after the obtaining of
the evidence sought to be introduced at the trial. See State v. Krozel, 24 Conn. Supp.
266, 190 A.2d 61 (1963).
